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BARGAINING POWER ON BROADWAY:
WHY CONGRESS SHOULD PASS THE
PLAYWRIGHTS LICENSING ANTITRUST
INITIATIVE ACT IN THE ERA OF
HOLLYWOOD ON BROADWAY
Ashley Kelly∗
INTRODUCTION
The presence of “pic-to-legit musicals” on Broadway has been
around for decades. 1 In recent years, Broadway has seen its share
of motion pictures turned into musical hits 2 as well as
Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2009; B.A. Barnard College, 2004. The
author wishes to thank Ralph Sevush and David Faux, Brooklyn Law School
‘05, for giving her the opportunity to intern with the Dramatists Guild. She
would also like to thank her parents, Hugh and Suzy Kelly, and her brothers,
Chris and Sean, for understanding why she could not come home for
Thanksgiving. Finally, she wishes to thank Will Page for keeping her head on
straight.
1
The industry term “pic-to-legit musicals” refers to motion pictures that
become plays in “legitimate” theatre. See Gordon Cox, Broadway’s “Blonde”
Ambition, V ARIETY, Mar. 26, 2007–Apr. 1, 2007, at 39 (“‘Sweet Charity’
(1966) was based on ‘Nights of Cabiria,’ ‘Applause’ (1970) grew out of ‘All
About Eve,’ and ‘Nine’ (1982) took its story from ‘8 ½ . . . .’”).
2
“ ‘ The Lion King’ (1997), ‘The Producers’ (2001) and ‘Hairspray’
(2002) [were] among the winners at both the box office and at the Tonys.” Id.
“ The Lion King,” adapted from the 1994 animated Disney film, has won over
thirty major theatre awards, including six Tony awards, and recently celebrated
its tenth anniversary on Broadway. See Andrew Gans, Empire State Building
and Sardi’s to Honor Disney’s Lion King, PLAYBILL , Nov. 8, 2007, available
at http://www.playbill.com/news/article/112596.html. “ The Producers,”
adapted from the 1968 Academy Award-winning film, won twelve Tony awards,
the most ever awarded to one show, and ran on Broadway for six years before
∗
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disappointments.3 The 2007–2008 Broadway season alone features
four new musicals adapted from movies, including the Disney
production of “The Little Mermaid” and the Mel Brooks
adaptation of “Young Frankenstein.”4 In the coming seasons, hit
films such as “Gladiator”5 and “Shrek”6 will also be turned into
musical adaptations. For major motion picture studios, a musical
based on a movie can be a windfall as it reduces the risk of
investment.7 For critics, that same musical can provoke the fear
that “cherished musical-theater traditions are being suborned to
serve a disposable mass culture.”8 Outside of the studios and
critics, however, a larger issue looms: Before a movie-musical ever
hits a stage, there is a battle that audiences rarely think aboutthe
closing in April, 2007. See Kenneth Jones, Broadway Record-Breaker The
Producers Closes April 22, PLAYBILL , Apr. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.playbill.com/news/article/107445.html. “Hairspray,” adapted from
the 1988 film, won eight Tony awards and is still running on Broadway. See
http://hairspraythemusical.com/.
3
“Dirty Rotten Scoundrels,” a 2005 musical adapted from the 1988 film,
“never quite recouped on Broadway,” “The Wedding Singer,” a 2006 musical
adapted from the 1998 film “floundered,” and “High Fidelity,” another 2006
musical based on the 2000 film “as well as the book, barely opened.” See Cox,
supra note 1.
4
Michael Kuchwara, New Broadway Season: The Play’s the Thing,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 30, 2007, available at www.newsday.com/
entertainment/stage/ny-ffthe5391193sep30,0,161117.story.
5
See Mac Rogers, From Screen to Stage: How to Turn a Movie into a
Musical, SLATE , May 23, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2142258/.
“Gladiator,” won the 2001 Academy Award for Best Picture and grossed over
450 million dollars worldwide. See IMDB, Gladiator, http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0172495/ (follow “Awards” hyperlink; then follow “Box Office/Business”
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
6
John Weidman, The Seventh Annual Media and Society Lecture:
Protecting the American Playwright, 72 BROOK . L. REV. 639, 644 (2007)
(“The Shrek imprint represents a franchise of goldmine-like proportions.”) The
first “Shrek” film grossed 455 million dollars and the first sequel grossed 880
million dollars. Id.
7
See Rogers, supra note 5 (“The beauty of the movie-musical is that the
branding is already in place.”).
8
Id. “Their fear is that Broadway is becoming an adjunct to Hollywood,
where desperation to reach a mass audience raised on movies and television”
forces a dilution of traditional theatre. Id.
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battle for copyright control between the playwright and the
studio.9
At the core of this battle is the recognition that playwrights and
screenwriters deal in two distinct legal realities.10 This distinction
centers on the work made for hire doctrine of the Copyright Act of
1976, which carves out an exception to the rule that copyright
ownership vests in the party who actually created a work.11 If a
work is made for hire, the employer or hiring party is considered to
be the author and owns the copyright “unless there is a written
agreement to the contrary.”12 Independent contractors are not
employees under agency law,13 and their works may be “specially
ordered or commissioned” under limited conditions, in which case
the second clause of the work for hire doctrine applies and the
commissioning party controls the copyright.14 In order to actually
be a work made for hire under the second clause, two conditions
must be met: (1) the work has to fall within one of nine specified
categories,15 and (2) there must be a written agreement between the
parties that states the work is a work made for hire.16 Screenwriters
clearly fall into the “part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
9

See Weidman, supra note 6, at 645 (“The studio’s interest in
maintaining control of the content of the stage version of [a movie] seems
irreconcilable with the theatrical mandate which gives the playwright ultimate
control of the work which he creates.”).
10
See id. at 641–42 (“A screenwriter is an employee. . . . From the
beginning, he understands that everything he writes will immediately become
the property of the studio which employs him . . . . The playwright is an
independent contractor. He owns his own work and is free to dispose of it as he
sees fit.”).
11
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1989)).
12
Id.
13
Id. at 751.
14
U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 9.1104, Nov. 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf.
15
The nine categories are (1) a collective work; (2) as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work; (3) as a translation; (4) as a supplementary
work; (5) as a compilation; (6) as an instructional text; (7) as a test; (8) as
answer materials for a test; or (9) as an atlas. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
16
U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 14, at 2.
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work” category, meaning any work they do for a studio is owned
by that larger entity.17 In contrast, plays, and more broadly,
dramatic works, are not one of the nine categories and the work of
playwrights may not be specially ordered or commissioned like a
motion picture screenplay. 18
This brings us back to the battle between studios and
playwrights and the increasing presence of Hollywood on
Broadway with movie-musicals. Movie studios are producing on
Broadway in increasing numbers, but with the assumption that
they are in control of playwrights’ works as works for hire.19 John
Weidman, president of the Dramatists Guild,20 warns against the
dangers of allowing studios acting as producers on Broadway to
make their own rulesin essence, “build[ing] a wall around them
and keep[ing] them quarantined.”21 Weidman argues that while
individual playwrights have been resisting the pressures to work
under a work for hire regime, he admits that “with the appearance
of more and more studio-produced musicals like ‘Tarzan’ and
17

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
Alison Zamora, Legislative Update: The Playwright Licensing Antitrust
Initiative Act: Empowering the “Starving Artist” Through the Convergence of
Copyright, Labor, and Antitrust Policies, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.
& POL ’ Y 395, 421 (2006) (“[A] playwright is not an employee of the producer,
but rather an independent contractor.”); see 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also
Dramatists Guild’s Business Affairs FAQ, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/
business_faq.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) (“[Work made for hire] is not an
acceptable condition for writing in the theater, where authors still are entitled to
own and control their own work.”).
19
See Weidman, supra note 6, at 645 (“[T]he most aggressive of the
movie studios [bring] with them . . . a desire to do business, not according to
the theater model which put[s] the playwright in first position, but according to
the Hollywood model, in which the producing studio own[s] the author’s
copyright and writers [can] be hired and fired at will.”).
20
The Dramatists Guild is an advocacy organization composed of
playwrights, composers, and lyricists “who write for the first class theater and
who represent the common interests of playwrights.” Barr v. Dramatists Guild,
573 F. Supp. 555, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Weidman, supra note 6, at 639
(“The Dramatists Guild is the only national organization representing the
interests of playwrights, composers, and lyricists writing for the living stage.”).
21
Weidman, supra note 6, at 645 (“[A]s a general rule, what one producer
gets, all producers want.”).
18
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‘Aida,’ [these] pressures [on playwrights to relinquish copyright]
are only going to grow more intense.”22
In light of these mounting pressures, Congress must intervene.
Unlike screenwriters, playwrights are forced to negotiate with
studios without the collective bargaining power of an organization
like the Writers Guild of America (“WGA”)23 because Congress
has not granted the Dramatists Guild the right to collectively
bargain on behalf of playwrights. 24 For years, senators and house
representatives have proposed bills allowing the Dramatists Guild
the ability to collectively bargain.25 However, none of the bills have
ever been put to a vote.26
This Note advocates that now is the time for Congress to act
on behalf of playwrights by passing the Playwrights Licensing
Antitrust Initiative Act,27 which would allow playwrights as a
group to collectively bargain with the powerful Hollywood studios
now producing on Broadway.28 Part I addresses the functional
differences between playwrights and screenwriters and the varied
impact that the work made for hire doctrine has on playwrights and
screenwriters. Part II discusses bargaining power in the
entertainment industry, focusing on the negotiating power of the
Dramatists Guild and the WGA. Part III looks at the past and
current state of the Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act.
22

Id. at 644.
The WGA is a labor union and screenwriters’ collective bargaining
representative in the motion picture and television industry. Wellman v. Writers
Guild of Am., W., 146 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 1998).
24
See ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL ., T HEATER LAW : CASES AND MATERIALS
80 (2004) (“Because producers typically have the upper hand in . . .
negotiations, the [Dramatists] Guild has wanted to engage in collective
bargaining but cannot do soas a trade association rather than a labor union, its
activities are not shielded from the federal anti-trust laws.”).
25
Zamora, supra note 18, at 395.
26
Id.
27
Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, S. 2349, 108th
Cong. (2004).
28
The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing ] (statement of Senator
Orin Hatch).
23
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Part IV advocates for why, in light of past legislative arguments
and the growing presence of Hollywood studios as producers,
Congress should act now to bring a balance of bargaining power to
Broadway by passing the Playwrights Licensing Antitrust
Initiative Act.
I.

A UTHORIAL CONTROL: WRITING FOR THE STAGE AND SCREEN

The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright ownership
“vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”29 The
Supreme Court generally considers the author to be “the party who
actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea
into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”30
However, there is an exception to this rule, which is at the core of
the legal division between screenwriters and playwrights: the work
made for hire doctrine.31 Section 101 of the copyright law defines a
“work made for hire” as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work,
as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as
an instructional text, as a test, as answer materials for a test,
or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.32
If a work is created by an independent contractor, then the
work may be “specially ordered or commissioned” and therefore

29

17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2007).
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989)
(citing 17 U.S.C. §102 (2007)).
31
See Weidman, supra note 6, at 641–42; 17 U.S.C. § 201 (“In the case
of a work-made-for-hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author . . . and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright.” ).
32
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007); see U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 14, at 1.
30
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falls under the second clause of the work for hire doctrine,33 so long
as two conditions are met: that the work falls within one of nine
specified categories listed within 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) and that there
is a written agreement that states the work is a work made for
hire.34 The fundamental difference between screenwriters and
playwrights under the Copyright Act is that screenwriters write as
“part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,”35 thereby
working for hire, whereas playwrights do not fall into any of the
nine categories and subsequently maintain control of their
copyright.36 John Weidman put it best when he said, “[t]he
intermittent sense of suicidal desperation which playwrights and
screenwriters sometimes share is about the only thing they
share.”37
A. Playwrights: Creators for the Great White Way
The Dramatists Guild defines a playwright as any bookwriter,
composer, or lyricist who is involved in the initial stages of the
theatrical collaborative process and whose contribution is an
integral part of a play as presented in subsequent productions by
other producers.38 The playwright solely controls structure,
dialogue, theme, and plot. 39
Additionally, as author of a play, the playwright owns the
33

U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 14, at 2.
Id.
35
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
36
Zamora, supra note 18, at 421 (“[A] playwright is not an employee of
the producer, but rather an independent contractor.”). See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2007). See also Dramatists Guild’s Business Affairs FAQ, supra note 18
(“[Work made for hire] is not an acceptable condition for writing in the theater,
where authors still are entitled to own and control their own work.”).
37
Weidman, supra note 6, at 641.
38
Douglas Nevin, No Business Like Show Business: Copyright Law, The
Theatre Industry, and the Dilemma of Rewarding Collaboration, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1533, 1544 (2004).
39
Charles Isherwood, Go East, Young Writers, For Theater! N.Y. T IMES,
Nov. 13, 2007, at E1 (as opposed to the screenwriter whose work can be
“parceled out among a dozen writers and script supervisors and subject to
executive meddling”).
34
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intellectual property. 40 These rights include the copyright of the
play or musical.41 Because the playwright owns her work and is
free to dispose of it as she sees fit, the playwright can grant a
producer a defined package of performance rights for a limited time
while reserving all other rights to herself.42
Specified in most playwright licensing contracts with producers
is that all changes made to the script, title, stage business, or
performance of the play or musical also belong to the playwright. 43
Many licensing agreements between playwrights and producers
also specify that the playwright shall receive a percentage of the
gross box office receipts from the initial production of the work44
and retain ownership and control over all subsequent
productions.45 Indeed, a playwright is the only creator in the
theater industry who enjoys the exclusivity of retaining the right of
copyright ownership. 46 Playwrights are not typically hired to write
exclusively for an individual producer or Broadway theater.47
Though occasionally a theater or producer will commission a play,
most plays “are simply writtenby someone, somewhere with an
impulse and an idea.”48 More importantly, playwrights do not
40

See Richard Garmise, Author’s Bill of Rights, DRAMATIST, Oct. 1993,
available at http://www.dramatistsguild.com/files/authbill.pdf.
41
Id.
42
Weidman, supra note 6, at 641–42.
43
Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540; see Garmise, supra note 40. Typically, a
producer may make changes to the play with the playwright’s consent, but
regardless of whether the producer or the author composed the emendations, the
intellectual property belongs to the playwright. Id.
44
Typically between 5% and 7% of the gross weekly box office receipts.
See Richard Garmise, The Art of the Deal, Part 1: Money, Money, Money,
DRAMATIST, Nov. 1994, at 1.
45
See id. at 2. See also Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540.
46
Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540. See Weidman, supra note 6, at 642 ( “[I]t
is in the theater, and only in the theater, that [the playwright] . . . knows his
own unique, idiosyncratic voice will be heard, unedited and uncompromised.”).
47
See Zamora, supra note 18, at 421 (explaining that the relationship
between a producer and a playwright is limited to “the time it takes to
produce . . . one play” and if the producer wants to continue to work with the
playwright, “a new contract would have to be devised”).
48
Weidman, supra note 6, at 642.
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write plays as works made for hire.49
A playwright is not an employee under the first clause of the
work made for hire doctrine.50 In Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, the Supreme Court articulated a multi-factor test
for determining under what circumstances a creator acts as an
independent contractor and when she is an employee.51 The factors
to consider are (1) the hiring party’s right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished; (2) the skill
required; (3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools; (4) the
location of the work; (5) the duration of the relationship between
the parties; (6) whether the hiring parties have a right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hired
parties’ discretion over when and how long to work; (8) the
method of payment; (9) the hired party’s role in hiring and paying
assistants; (10) whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; (11) whether the hiring party is in business; (12)
the provision of employee benefits; and (13) the tax treatment of
the hired party.52
Applying the Supreme Court’s test to the relationship between
producers and playwrights, the factors demonstrate that
playwrights are not employees of producers.53 Producers do not
control the manner and means by which a play is written or
developed, rather, producers only become involved after a play has
been completed.54 The skill required is solely the playwright’s
specialized writing ability and talent and the source of the
instrumentality is her own imagination.55 The playwright uses her
own workspace and the working relationship with the producer
49

See Dramatists Guild’s Business Affairs FAQ, supra note 18.
17 U.S.C. §101 (2007). Under the first clause of the work made for hire
doctrine, a work qualifies as a work made for hire if it was “prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment.” Weidman, supra note 6,
at 641 (“The playwright is an independent contractor. He owns his work and is
free to dispose of it as he sees fit.”).
51
490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989).
52
Id.
53
Zamora, supra note 18, at 421.
54
Id.
55
Id.
50
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encompasses only the time it takes to produce the play.56 The play
is only licensed to the producer.57 Thus, the ability for a producer
to assign additional projects to the playwright is irrelevant, as is
the producer’s discretion over the timeline the playwright works,
since the relationship does not commence until after a play is
completed.58
The method of payment to the playwright is governed by the
licensing agreement.59 The playwright does not receive a salary, and
the playwright hires her own dramaturges60 if she requires them.61
There are no employment benefits bestowed upon the playwright
and producers do not take taxes out of the playwright’s share of
the profits from the production.62 Rather than outright control by a
producer, producers in the theater industry are rewarded for their
investment through subsidiary rights.63 In exchange for the initial
risk of developing a play’s first production, a producer is often
entitled to a percentage of all subsequent licensing of the play and
sometimes even a percentage of other rights such as film
adaptations.64 A playwright also does not come under the second
section of the work for hire doctrine because dramatic works do not
fall into one of the nine specified categories.65
56

Id.
See Dramatist’s Bill of Rights, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/about_
rights.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) (“When a university, producer or theatre
wants to mount a production of your play, you actually license (or lease) the
public performance rights to your dramatic property to that entity for a finite
period of time.”).
58
Zamora, supra note 18, at 421.
59
See Garmise, supra note 40, at 1.
60
See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 197 n.5 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
role of the dramaturg can include any number of the elements that go into the
crafting of a play, such as actual plot elements, dramatic structure, character
details, themes, and even specific language.”) (internal quotations omitted).
61
Zamora, supra note 18, at 421.
62
Id.
63
Nevin, supra note 38, at 1541.
64
Id.
65
A playwright’s play is not “a contribution to a collective work, . . . a
part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, . . . a translation, . . . a
supplementary work, . . . a compilation, . . . an instructional text, . . . a
57
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However, a playwright’s ability to retain copyright is not
absolute. A playwright may assign her copyright to a producer,66
and indeed some contracts with producers require such provisions.
For example, a contract may contain language stating that if the
work is not a work made for hire, the playwright nonetheless
irrevocably transfers and assigns the producer all rights, title, and
interest therein, including all copyrights.67 Unaware of the
ramifications, playwrights often sign such contracts, without
understanding that they are losing their rightfully entitled
intellectual property for at least 35 years, at which point they may
terminate the transfer of rights to the producer.68 In an industry
riddled with egoism, paranoia, and severe financial hardship, 69
playwrights are often blinded by “artistic euphoria and dreams of
box office glory” and frequently fail to consider legal and business
safeguards in their contracts.70
Though playwrights enjoy the unique privilege of retaining
copyright ownership, it is a right that must be safeguarded.
Playwrights are considered at the bottom of the “financial totem
pole” in the theater industry 71 and accordingly have little bargaining
leverage with producers, especially large motion picture studios
acting as producers.72 Because standards in theater are low to begin
test, . . . answer materials for a test, or . . . an atlas.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
66
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2007).
67
The playwright, through a written conveyance, may transfer in whole or
in part “any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright.” See 17 U.S.C. §
201(d).
68
See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2007).
69
Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540. Though a playwright may write many
plays throughout her career, a play’s production is expensive and complicated,
but unless a play is produced, the playwright does not earn any money from her
craft. Even if it is produced once, it is rare that it is optioned for additional
productions. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Law in the Plays of Elmer Rice, 19
CARDOZO STUD . L. & LIT . 401, 403–04 (2007) (“A new play almost always
has to be instantly successful to last more than a brief time, and if its initial
production does not succeed, it is unlikely ever to be produced again.”).
70
Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540.
71
See Isherwood, supra note 39, at E1 (“[I]t is not easy to earn a good
living strictly as a playwright.”). See also Jonakait, supra note 69, at 403–04.
72
See Weidman, supra note 6, at 644.
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with, the average advance against royalties for a 99-seat production
is only between $2,000 and $5,000, with a 5% to 7% share in gross
box office receipts post-recoupment. 73 If a playwright is successful
enough to engage a Broadway production, the starting advance will
be significantly higher but still not very lucrative, usually in the
range of tens of thousands of dollars.74
With such small returns and little safeguard against the
bargaining strength of producers, playwrights are increasingly
drawn to Hollywood to write for television and film, giving up
their roles for those as screenwriters.75 While they are more likely
to earn enough money to support their writing careers,76 they
73

See Victor Knapp & Ralph Sevush, The Money Flow, DRAMATIST,
July–Aug. 2001, at Newsletter 2–3. The advance that a small theater gives a
playwright is non-refundable but recoupable from the royalties that the
playwright earns from ticket sales of an entire production run. DONALD A.
FARBER, PRODUCING T HEATRE: A COMPREHENSIVE AND LEGAL BUSINESS
GUIDE 196 (3d ed. 2006). The production contract usually will specify how
many performances the play has been licensed for, but this typically does not
alter the amount of the advance. Id. Recoupment occurs when all production
costs incurred in presenting a play for a given production have been returned to
the investors of the play. Id.
74
See, e.g., H AROLD L. FOGEL , ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS
468 (7th ed. 2001) (“The fees for rights for a major performance of [a show like
Rodgers and Hammerstein’s musical “Oklahoma”] are customarily in the area of
8% of box-office gross, with an advance against royalties of $18,000 or more.”).
Though more than the advance for a small theatre production or Off-Broadway,
this is still lower than the multi-million dollar advances seen by Hollywood
screenwriters. See Dana Kennedy, Screenwriters Adjust to Being Bit Players
Again, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at B15 (“The newcomer, David Benioff, was
paid $1.8 million upfront for ‘Stay.’”).
75
Nevin, supra note 38, at 1569 (“Despite intermittent moments of
excellence, the American theatre has faced a considerable challenge during the
last few decades. Exciting and vital artists are decamping for the hills of
Hollywood, taking with them the innovative approaches that define each
generation of the theatrical movement.”); see also The Playwrights Licensing
Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the Future of American Live Theater:
Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Marsha Norman, Vice President, Dramatists
Guild).
76
See Isherwood, supra note 39, at E1 (“In theory a talented writer
interested in making plays and making a living in other media should be able to
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ultimately sacrifice their intellectual property rights in Hollywood.
B. Screenwriters: All of the Money, None of the Control
In sharp contrast to playwrights, film and television
screenwriters are almost always employees of a production, and
their work product is normally characterized as work for hire.77 In
essence, screenwriters are paid to write. This includes plots,
characters, twists, turns, and whatever else the studio desires.78
Typically a screenwriter receives a large advance from her studio
before she even begins writing and will receive additional sums of
money as subsequent drafts are submitted.79 A standard option
payment for a feature film can range from $10,000 to $25,000.80
From the 1920s until the late 1940s, movie studios had their
own “stables of writers” composed of screenwriters tied
exclusively to particular studios.81 These screenwriters were
do both. But in practice it doesn’t seem easy. A lot of writers who head west
never look back . . . . Young writers who win some acclaim for a first or second
play will probably continue to head west before they have had time to develop,
which means the theater is potentially losing important voices before they
mature.”).
77
Nevin, supra note 38, at 1542. See Matthew J. McDonough, Moral
Rights and the Movies: The Threat and Challenge of the Digital Domain, 31
SUFFOLK U. L. REV . 455, 473 (1997) (“Because of a significant disparity in
bargaining power, directors and screenwriters are almost always employed or
otherwise contracted for work pursuant to the work for hire doctrine, with the
motion picture studio alone as copyright owner.”).
78
Weidman, supra note 6, at 642.
79
Id.
80
STEPHEN BREIMER, T HE SCREENWRITER’S LEGAL GUIDE 12 (3d ed.
2004). The option payment gives a producer exclusive control to use the
screenwriter’s work. When the option period expires, it can be exercised and the
work can be purchased, at which time the screenwriter receives a purchase
payment, which can be hundreds of thousands of dollars additionally paid to the
screenwriter. Id. at 11–13.
81
Id. at 1. During this time, Hollywood ran on a “studio system,” with
major studios (e.g., MGM, Paramount, etc.) producing movies on their own
lots with creative personnel (directors, actors, and screenwriters) under long-term
contracts. See Mark Weinstein, Profit-Sharing Contracts in Hollywood:
Evolution and Analysis, 27 J. LEGAL STUD . 67, 71 (1998).
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employees within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act and
work for hire doctrine.82 However, as the large movie studios’
empires began to crumble,83 so did the practice of retaining inhouse screenwriters.84 Thus, when the Copyright Act came up for
revision in the 1960s, movie studios were some of the most vocal
lobbying forces in Congress. 85 Because of their efforts (and likely
their financial resources), the studios were successful in having
motion pictures included among the nine exceptions of the second
clause of the work for hire definition.86 Specifically, the works of
screenwriters are characterized as “specially commissioned works”
under 17 U.S.C. § 101(2), vesting all copyright ownership with the
motion picture or television studio.87
Under this scheme, the studio is considered the sole legal author
of the script and may fully exploit a screenwriter’s creation.88
82

See 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909). See also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 748 (1989) (determining an employment relationship
existed sufficient to give the hiring party copyright ownership whenever that
party has the right to control or supervise the artist’s work).
83
Hollywood moved away from the studio system after the 1948 decision
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131 (1948), which forced the major studios to dissolve their monopolies over
vertically integrated exhibition, production, and distribution studio systems. See
Weinstein, supra note 81, at 71.
84
As the studio systems dissolved, the amount of writers under contract by
the studios dropped. See Weinstein, supra note 81, at 89.
85
See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision, Part 5: 1964 Revision Bill with
Discussion and Comments Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 298–
309 (1965) (statement by the Motion Picture Association of America)
[hereinafter MPAA Statement] (“We have indicated all along that provisions
such as [the work for hire provisions] are the heart and soul of the operation of
commercial and personnel relationships in our industry, without which there
would be a very severe upset.”).
86
See Seth F. Gorman, Who Owns the Movies? Joint Authorship under the
Copyright Act of 1976 after Childress v. Taylor and Thomson v. Larson, 7
U.C.L.A. ENT . L. R EV . 1, 23 (1999).
87
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). See also Gorman, supra note 86, at 23.
88
BREIMER, supra note 80, at 4 (“[O]ur own laws have helped to reinforce
the philosophy that the employed writer can be forgotten.”); see Weidman,
supra note 6, at 641 (“As legal author of the film, [the] studio can change the
content of the screenwriter’s script at will. His pirate captain can become a
teenage runaway, his teenage runaway a Cocker Spaniel, his original story, set
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While playwrights do their own rewriting and have the last word
on their scripts, Hollywood scripts do not remain in the hands of
just one screenwriter and are almost always rewritten by another, if
not many other screenwriters.89 Moreover, because the studios
own the copyright in scripts, they have “free reign to decide
whether to modify the content of a film to suit [their] . . . needs.”90
Though screenwriters have been known to balk at the creative
control they forfeit to studios,91 Stephen Breimera well-known
Hollywood entertainment attorney 92advises screenwriters to
“not bite the hand that feeds you. . . . [W]hine about [the system]
and you will be labeled a whiner. . . . [T]he system is the system. It
is unlikely to change.”93 Because a screenwriter relinquishes all
creative control over her screenplay, her name becomes her sole
professional asset.94 However, even the decision to credit a
screenwriter by name is relinquished to the producer.95

in Boston during the War of 1812, can be moved to the fifth moon of Jupiter.”).
89
BREIMER, supra note 80, at 2.
90
“Absent a contractual agreement to the contrary, filmmakers remain
powerless to prevent a studio from making significant changes to a motion
picture.” McDonough, supra note 77, at 477. Modern digital technology makes
it possible for a studio to alter, delete, or add scenes to a film to make it more
palatable to certain audiences. Id. at 476.
91
See, e.g., Sean Mitchell, Written Out of the Script, L.A. T IMES, Nov.
11, 2007, at M1 (“Regardless of the head-turning sums they can make,
screenwriters are often treated like second-class Hollywood citizens, routinely
replaced by other writers and often not even invited to the set of a movie they’ve
written.”).
92
Stephen Breimer is a partner of Bloom, Hergott, and Diemer, LLP, in
Beverly Hills, California. Prior to his legal career in entertainment law, he
produced for film and television. See BREIMER, supra note 80, at xviii–xvix.
93
Id. at 6.
94
Wellman v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 146 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.
1998) (“The credit does not merely satisfy a writer’s longing to see his name in
lights; it can propel him to other workperhaps to the next blockbuster.”).
95
Id.
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II. BARGAINING WITH STUDIO PRODUCERS: WRITERS AND
G UILD P OWER
For a Hollywood studio, obtaining copyright ownership for the
works it creates is perceived as essential in order to fully exploit
the works regardless of whether the works are major motion
pictures or pic-to-legit musicals.96 Production and exploitation of a
work often requires a studio to risk millions of dollars,97 and if the
studio did not have all rights in the work, expenses would
drastically increase. For example, industry essentials such as
marketing could be subject to a multitude of termination rights that
would be difficult to overcome.98 Not surprisingly, because the
studio has a financial interest behind the work, it tries to ensure
that it is holding the entire bundle of rights. 99
Generally, the work made for hire doctrine tips the negotiating
scales in favor of the copyright holder.100 To help promote more
balance in Hollywood, a strong collection of guilds has formed to
support the creative employees negotiating with big studios. 101 For
96

See Michael Carter Smith, Work For Hire: Revision on the Horizon, 30
IDEA: L.J. & T ECH . 21, 29–30 (1989).
97
According to the Motion Picture Association of America, major motion
picture studios pay an average of $106.6 million to produce and market a film.
See Josh Friedman, Movie Ticket Sales Hit Record; But a Report on the
Industry’s Health May Understate the True Cost of Making Films, L.A. T IMES,
Mar. 6, 2008, at C1.
98
See Smith, supra note 96, at 31. Without sole ownership of all rights,
the studio would be obligated to keep track of multiple licenses subject to
termination, limiting not only their ability to exploit the work of the
screenwriter but also the director and the many creative contributors to a film.
For example, a producer may not be able to sell a film in a foreign market unless
nationality vests in one authorthe studio. Id.
99
See Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution, and the Need for
Disclosure: A Study of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L.
REV . 53, 66 (1994).
100
Id.
101
Movie and television actors are represented by the Screen Actors Guild
and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists. MELVIN
SIMENSKY , ENTERTAINMENT LAW 105 (3d ed. 2003). The writers are
represented by the WGA. See infra Part II.A. The directors are represented by
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instance, film and television writers are represented by the WGA,
which has the ability to collectively bargain with the studios.102
Within the context of Hollywood productions on Broadway, it is
increasingly common for the studios to collectively bargain with
the Actors Equity Association,103 which represents live theater
performers, and the Local One of the International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees (“IATSE”).104 Playwrights, however,
cannot participate in these types of collective bargaining
conversations because, while they may be members of the
Dramatists Guild, the Dramatists Guild is not enabled to enter into
collectively bargained agreements. 105 Subsequently, while
screenwriters gain a certain amount of bargaining power through
their guild, playwrights are left without strong advocates.106

the Directors Guild of America. SIMENSKY, supra note 101, at 105; see also
infra note 136.
102
Wellman v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 146 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.
1998). See also infra Part II.A.
103
Founded in 1913, Actor’s Equity Association is the labor union
representing American actors and stage managers in the theatre. The organization
collectively bargains on behalf of the actors and stage managers. See
http://www.actorsequity.org/AboutEquity/aboutequityhome.asp (last visited
Apr. 1, 2008).
104
Local One of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees is
the labor union that represents Broadway stagehands. The organization has the
power to collectively bargain with producers. See http://www.iatselocalone.org/
about/aboutus.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
105
The Dramatists Guild is a trade organization, as opposed to a labor
union, and its activities are not shielded from federal anti-trust laws. See
discussion infra Part II.B.
106
Id.
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A. The Writers Guild of America: Formidable Opponent in
Studio Negotiations

Screenwriters are represented by one of the more powerful
guilds in the entertainment industry.107 When disputes between
screenwriters and producers arise, the screenwriters turn to the
Writers Guild of America, a labor union and the screenwriters’
collective bargaining representative in the motion picture and
television industry. 108 The WGA primarily represents
screenwriters involved in work made for hire situations109 and
performs writing functions for employers engaged in the
production of motion pictures and television.110 While
screenwriters pay yearly dues to the WGA, the studios contribute
as well, paying a percentage of pension, health, and welfare
benefits to the WGA with respect to each writing assignment for
which the studio employs a WGA member.111
Since 1954, the WGA112 has “negotiated and administered
minimum basic agreements with major film producers and networks
and stations, covering theatrical and television films, broadcast and
cable television, documentary film and radio, public and commercial
television.”113 In recent years, the WGA has expanded its coverage
107

In 2007, for example, the WGA was able to gain the support of the
Screen Actors Guild, which represents the entertainment industries acting
celebrities, and, as a coalition, forced the canceling of the annual Golden Globe
Awards. See Patrick Goldstein, It’s a Writers Strike, But the Actors Play a
Major Role, L.A. T IMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at E1; see also, e.g., Damon Lindelof,
Mourning TV, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 11, 2007, at D13.
108
Wellman v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 146 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.
1998).
109
Almost all agreements between studios and screenwriters are work made
for hire situations. Nevin, supra note 38, at 1540.
110
Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Writers Guild of Am., W., 437 U.S. 411
(1978).
111
BREIMER, supra note 80, at 215.
112
The WGA is split into two divisions: WGA, East and WGA, West.
See Writers Guild History, http://www.wgaeast.org/index.php/articles/article/
499?startnum=&sort=&letter=&wgc=109# (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
113
Id.
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to staff members of radio and television stations, “the latter group
mostly in the news and documentary areas, including news writers
and others at ABC and CBS and a number of major individual
stations.”114
The agreements promulgated by the WGA dominate in the
entertainment industry. 115 Members of the WGA “enjoy the
benefits, privileges and protections under the various national
Minimum Basic Agreements in effect in the field of radio,
television and motion pictures.”116 WGA protections are minimum
protections and screenwriters are often able to negotiate better
terms based on their previous work.117 Many major motion picture
studios’ production agreements with screenwriters are governed by
the WGA, and WGA writers write most television network
programming.118 Studios’ use of WGA screenwriters is so
pervasive and exclusive that the only opportunities for non-WGA
screenwriters are in animation, low budget pictures, and some basic
cable programming.119
Although the WGA originally ceded screenwriters’ copyrights
to the studios in 1942,120 the WGA has progressively wielded its
bargaining power over the years to try to regain more rights for
screenwriters.121 For example, in 1988, the WGA added a provision
to its standard agreement, known as a reversion, that allows a
screenwriter the limited right to regain control over his copyright
under certain conditions.122 If the screenwriter’s script is original
114

Id.
BREIMER, supra note 80, at 287.
116
Writers Guild History, supra note 112.
117
BREIMER, supra note 80, at 8.
118
Id. at 287.
119
Id. Some of the contested issues in the 2007 WGA strike were gaining
guild jurisdiction over animation and basic cable programming. WGA Contract
2007 Proposals, http://www.wga.org/contract_07/proposalsfull2.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1, 2008).
120
See Mitchell, supra note 91, at M1 (“The agreement reached with the
newly founded Writers Guild in 1942 contained the defining clause that survives
to this day: ‘The studio, hereinafter, referred to as the author . . .’ making it
clear where the writer stood after the sale of his work—or service, as it were.”).
121
See BREIMER, supra note 80, at 42–43.
122
Id.
115
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and not adapted from any pre-existing material, the screenwriter
may reacquire copyright of the script five years after either (1) the
studio’s purchase or license of the material or (2) the last draft is
written so long as the material is not in active development and the
studio still owns the first draft.123 Because it is incredibly rare to
see a basic reversion term in a studio contract with a screenwriter,
this WGA provision is the only way for a writer to have a chance
at getting back his material.124
Today, the WGA aggressively advocates on behalf of
screenwriters and continues to bargain with studios to keep the
terms of the WGA Minimum Agreement on pace with
technological advancements in the entertainment industry. 125 This
past winter, the WGA engaged in a 100-day bargaining struggle
with studios over the future of digital media residuals for writers.126
Every three years, the collectively bargained WGA Minimum Basic
Agreement is renegotiated with the Alliance of Motion Picture and
Television Producers (“AMPTP”).127 After three months of
contentious negotiations went sour and the expiration of the most
123

See 2004 Writers Guild of America—Alliance of Motion Picture &
Television Producers Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement, at § 16.A.8,
available at http://wga.org/uploadedFiles/writers_resources/contracts/MBA04.
pdf [hereinafter WGA Basic Agreement]. See also BREIMER, supra note 80, at
42–43.
124
BREIMER, supra note 80, at 43 (“The best thing about the WGA
provision is not just that it exists, which is a major accomplishment in itself,
but that it covers commissioned works as well as material that is purchased.”).
125
See, e.g., Richard Verrier & Claudia Eller, Hollywood Writers Strike As
Talks Fail; The Studios and the Guild Prepare for a Long Work Stoppage,
L.A. T IMES, Nov. 5, 2007, at A1.
126
See id.; see also Richard Verrier & Claudia Eller, Strike Report; And
That’s a Wrap! Walkout to End; After 100 Days and Untold Losses, Writers
Vote Overwhelmingly to Get Back to Work, L.A. T IMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at C1.
Digital media residuals are derived from Internet downloads, straight-to-internet
content, on-demand online distribution, and video on demand. See Verrier &
Eller, supra note 125, at A1; see also Lindelof, supra note 107, at D13 (“[F]or
more than 50 years, writers have been entitled to a small cut of the studios’
profits from the reuse of our shows or movies; whenever something we created
ends up in syndication or is sold on DVD, we receive royalties. But the studios
refuse to apply the same rules to the Internet.”).
127
See, e.g., WGA Basic Agreement, supra note 123.
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recent contract on October 31, 2007,128 the WGA membership
authorized a screenwriters’ strike129 which went into effect on
November 5, 2007.130 The contentious issues were DVD
residuals,131 union jurisdiction over animation132 and reality
television,133 and residuals for new media.134 More than 12,000
writers “traded their laptops for picket signs.”135
In January, 2008, after eleven weeks of picketing and stalled
negotiation, tensions between the WGA and AMPTP broke and
talks resumed in the wake of an agreement made between the
AMPTP and another industry guild, the Directors Guild of
America.136 A month later, on February 12, 2008, the members of
128

Michael Cieply, To Strike or Not? Hollywood’s Next Drama, N.Y.
T IMES, Sept. 1, 2007, at B7.
129
Richard Verrier, Writers Guild Votes 90% In Favor of Strike, L.A.
T IMES, Oct. 20, 2007, at C1.
130
Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, With Resolution Unlikely, Writers
Guild Sets Strike for Monday, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 3, 2007, at C1.
131
In April of 2004, the New York Times reported that studios made $4.8
billion in DVD sales versus $1.78 billion at the box office. Sharon Waxman,
Swelling Demand for Disks Alters Hollywood’s Arithmetic, N.Y. T IMES, Apr.
20, 2004, at E1. The WGA claims that DVD residuals are necessary to a
writer’s income to cover periods in between employment, which is common in
the industry. The WGA wants the residual rate to double from what amounts to
4 cents per DVD sold up to 8 cents per DVD sold. WGA Contract 2007
Proposals, supra note 119.
132
According to the WGA, 100% of animated screenplays in 2005 were
written by at least one WGA member. However, the Minimum Basic
Agreement currently does not include animation. See WGA Contract 2007
Proposals, supra note 119.
133
The WGA argues that the process of creating interesting scenarios and
shaping raw material into a narrative with conflict and character arc should fall
under WGA contract. They advocate for the creation of “Story Producer” and
“Supervising Story Producer” as acceptable forms of credit. See id.
134
See Verrier & Eller, supra note 125, at A1. The WGA proposes that all
television and theatrical content re-used on non-traditional media like the
Internet or phones will earn a residual payment of 2.5% of the distributor’s
gross. See WGA Contract 2007 Proposals, supra note 131.
135
David Carr, New Media, New Values, Old Trouble, N.Y. T IMES, Nov.
5, 2007, at C1.
136
See Richard Verrier & Claudia Eller, Strike Report; Writers, Studios to
Revive Negotiations; the Directors Accord Opens the Door to Ending the
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the WGA voted overwhelmingly to end the strike.137 The deal
struck between the writers and the producers provides writers with
residual payments for shows streamed over the internet and
secures the WGA’s jurisdiction for programming created for the
internet.138 The WGA strike proved that there are opportunities to
exploit the vulnerability of studios in negotiations.139 Because
playwrights are deprived of the opportunity to collectively bargain
in the same way that their screenwriting peers can, playwrights are
denied an invaluable opportunity to attempt to close the gap in
bargaining leverage in negotiations with Hollywood studios
producing on Broadway.
B. The Dramatists Guild: The Toothless Voice of Playwrights
While screenwriters have a strong labor union fighting for them,
playwrights have no union to argue on their behalf. Instead,
playwrights must rely on advocacy groups to collectively
represent their interests. The most prominent of these groups is
the Dramatists Guildan advocacy organization representing the
common interests of playwrights, composers, and lyricists
involved in theater.140 The Dramatists Guild was started in 1919
under the umbrella of the Authors League of America.141 The
Nearly 11-Week Old Strike, L.A. T IMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at C1. The Directors
Guild deal doubled residual payments for television shows and films sold online
and extended union contracts to Web shows.
137
See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1.
138
See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1.
139
At the start of the strike, it was predicted that without screenwriters, an
entire season of television would be lost, and no pilots would be shot in the
spring. See Lindelof, supra note 107, at D13. When the strike ended in
February 2008, it “proved to be far more economically damaging than the
studios had expected, shutting down more than 60 TV shows, hampering
ratings and depriving networks of tens of millions of advertising dollars.” Verrier
& Eller, supra note 126, at C1.
140
Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See
Mission Statement of the Dramatists Guild, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/
about_mission.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
141
The Authors League of America includes the Authors Guild, which
solely represents book authors and the Dramatists Guild. See History of the
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purpose of the Dramatists Guild is to “protect and promote the
professional interests of playwrights” by advocating “to improve
the conditions under which their works are created and
produced.”142 The Dramatists Guild not only represents the
interests involved in theatrical productions, but also “those broader
concerns which affect directly or indirectly the role of the theatre in
society.”143
As an advocate for playwrights, the Dramatists Guild
advocates for the enhancement of playwrights’ bargaining power
by encouraging playwrights to negotiate for terms the Dramatists
Guild pushes as minimum standards producers should meet,
promulgating model agreements for use by members,144 and
advising members on standard industry terms concerning advances,
royalties, billing, and script changes.145 For first-class productions,
such as a large-scale Broadway musical or play, playwrights that
are members of the Dramatists Guild are encouraged to use a guild
Dramatists Guild of America, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/about_
history.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) (“Matters of joint concern to authors and
dramatists, such as copyright and freedom of expression, remain in the province
of the [Authors] League, other matters, such as contract terms and subsidiary
rights, are in the province of the [g]uilds.”).
142
Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 563.
143
Mission Statement of the Dramatists Guild, supra note 140 (the
Dramatists Guild claims it carries out its mission by “[f]ormulating production
contracts; [p]romoting and protecting playwrights through these contracts . . . ;
[e]xpressing a public opinion . . . on issues which affect the role the [playwright]
plays in the theatre and in society in general; [w]orking with other theatrical
institutions to educate them to the primacy of the author in theatrical
production; [and] [i]dentifying emerging trends in theatre, and responding
affirmatively and actively on an institutional basis to such trends.”).
144
JARVIS, supra note 24, at 80 (“[These agreements are] respectively
known as the ‘Approved Production Contract for Plays’ and the ‘Approved
Production Contract for Musicals.’”).
145
Members of the Dramatists Guild are encouraged to meet with the
Director of Business Affairs when they are approached with production
agreements to discuss the contracts before signing and to learn about how they
can advocate for better terms. However, it is the playwright who must negotiate
on her own with a producer, not the Dramatists Guild on her behalf. See
Dramatists Guild Member Benefits, Business Advice, http://www.
dramatistsguild.com/mem_benefits_business.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
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certified Approved Production Contract (“APC”).146 The APC is a
licensing agreement which sets forth minimum terms relating to
fees, advances against royalties, territorial restrictions, and
subsidiary rights for stock and amateur performances as well as
motion picture rights. 147 Moreover, the APC grants the producer
the right to produce the play as written by the playwright, but
protects the playwright by preventing the producer from making
any changes to the text, lyrics and/or music.148 The playwright
additionally retains the right to approve the director, the cast, and
all other creative elements of the play such as the scenic, costume
and lighting designers.149 The APC is negotiated between the
playwright’s agent and the producer, who is often supported by
the League of American Theaters and Producers.150 The APC then
goes through a certification process by the Dramatists Guild, to
ensure that the negotiated contract conforms to the minimum
standards of the Dramatists Guild.151 If an APC does not conform
to these terms, the playwright is asked to leave the guild.152
For all the goals that the Dramatists Guild strives for, however,
it cannot really enforce the APC as a requirement of the theatre
industry, leaving playwrights to ultimately negotiate their own

146

The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Gerald
Schoenfeld, Chairman of The League of American Theaters and Producers).
147
Id.
148
See ALEXANDER LINDSEY & MICHAEL LANDAU , Approved Production
Contract for Plays, in 5 LINDSEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, P UBLISHING , & THE
ARTS § 11:8 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter APC]. Article VIII, Section 8.02(b)
requires that any changes that are made shall be the property of the playwright.
149
Id. at Art. 1, § 1.01(b).
150
See Hearing, supra note 146 (statement of Gerald Schoenfeld, Chairman
of The League of American Theaters and Producers).
151
See APC, supra note 148, at Art. XVI.
152
Id. Playwrights are not required to use an APC as an industry
requirement; rather, the Dramatists Guild requires use of an APC for
membership. A playwright is free to leave the Dramatists Guild and negotiate
on her own if she is willing to take less favorable terms than those promulgated
under the APC.
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deals with producers.153 This is because the Dramatists Guild is a
trade organization rather than a labor union, and therefore, its
activities are not shielded from federal anti-trust laws. 154 In fact,
over the last sixty years, the Dramatists Guild has been involved in
numerous disputes regarding the applicability of restrictions under
the Sherman Act.155
The first major dispute involving a standard contract certified
by the Dramatists Guild was brought before the United States
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1945.156 The plaintiff, a
153

JARVIS, supra note 24, at 80. The playwright must ultimately decide to
hold her ground and only accept APC terms, and thus stay within her
membership requirements as set by the Dramatists Guild, or negotiate for less
favorable terms and choose to lose the benefits of being a member of the
Dramatists Guild. For many, the opportunity to be produced at all outweighs
the harm of taking less than favorable terms. However, the more playwrights
unable to acquire APC terms, the greater the dilution to the bargaining power of
all playwrights.
154
“ The term ‘antitrust laws’ has the meaning given it in section (a) of the
first section of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2007), except that such term
includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(2007), to the extent that such section applies to unfair methods of competition.”
See Playwrights Licensing Relief Act of 2002, S. 2082, 107th Cong. (2002).
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prevent economic harm caused by
restraints of trade, such as price-fixing. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2007) (“Every
contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to
be illegal.”). Setting minimum standards in a contract, such as the APC, has
been interpreted as a form of price-fixing. See Ring v. Spina (Ring I), 148 F.2d
647, 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
Anti-trust laws seek to ensure that competitors be treated fairly, promote
equal opportunities, and to disperse economic and social power. See THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE W ORKING GROUP SERIES, COMMENTARY ON THE ROLE
OF
ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST LAW 3 (2006), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/2_06WG3Report.pdf; see
also Zamora, supra note 18, at 399 (“If associations are not deemed labor
unions, the Sherman Act prohibits them from collectively negotiating the terms
of licensing agreements . . . .”).
155
The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of the
Dramatists Guild of America).
156
Ring I, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
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producer, took over production of a play from another producer
who had already signed the Dramatists Guild’s Minimum Basic
Agreement (a pre-cursor to the APC) with the defendants, the
authors of the play. 157 When the replacement producer attempted
to make changes to the play without the authors’ consent, the
authors brought a breach of contract claim for failure to obtain their
consent.158 The Second Circuit held that the new producer made a
prima facie showing of illegality, emphasizing that the producer
was exactly the type of person whom the Sherman Act sought to
protect. 159 Though the producer was not awarded any damages and
the injunction which required the authors to offer the producer the
chance to produce the play was later discontinued,160 the decision
strongly suggested that playwrights were not employees, and the
Dramatists Guild, therefore, was not a labor union entitled to the
labor exemption to the anti-trust law.161
Subsequent case law involving the theater further exacerbated
the tenuous position of the Dramatists Guild.162 In Bernstein v.

157

Id. at 649.
Id. The authors requested arbitration pursuant to the agreement, but the
producer sued, claiming that the authors and the Dramatists Guild had violated
the Sherman Act by creating a monopolistic contract through collective
bargaining among members of the Dramatists Guild. Id. The Dramatists Guild
argued it was a labor union and should come under the § 17 exemption of the
Sherman Act. Id.
159
Id. at 653. The court argued that the Sherman Act seeks to protect an
individual from “combinations fashioned by others and offered to such
individual as the only feasible method by which he may do business.” Id.
160
The issue of damages was remanded to the District Court, which held
that since the allegations made on the motion for a preliminary injunction had
been proven, the producer was entitled to injunctive relief. Ring v. Spina (Ring
II), 84 F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Both the producer and the
Dramatists Guild appealed. In a decision by Judge Learned Hand, the Second
Circuit discontinued the injunction because of the absence of a “tangible
probability that the wrong [would] be repeated.” Ring v. Spina (Ring III), 186
F.2d 637, 643 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Ring I, 148 F.2d at 649; Ring II, 186
F.3d at 643.
161
See Ring II, 84 F. Supp. at 408; Ring III, 186 F.2d at 643.
162
Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of
America).
158

KELLY

7/21/08 4:06 PM

BARGAINING POWER ON BROADWAY

903

Universal Pictures, 163 the Second Circuit held that movie and
television composers were independent contractors rather than
employees, and thus violated the Sherman Act by collectively
bargaining with producers.164 The same year, however, the court in
Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc.,165
found that stage directors are employees and not independent
contractors like playwrights or composers.166 The contrary
decisions regarding other creatives’ statuses as either independent
contractors or employees,167 using playwrights as a comparison, 168
left the Dramatists Guild exposed to more antitrust litigation.
Almost forty years after Ring v. Spina, the League of New
York Theaters and Producers (“the League”) again brought the
Dramatists Guild’s Minimum Basic Production Contract
(“MBPC”) under fire.169 Richard Barr, the president of the League,
alleged a conspiracy among playwrights and the Dramatists Guild
“to restrain trade and commerce in the sale of authors’ works for

163

517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975) (antitrust dispute between Composers and
Lyricists Guild of America (“CLGA”) and a group of television and motion
picture producers asking whether composers are employees or independent
contractors). The CLGA and the Dramatists Guild are similar in status and
purpose. Both organizations are advocacy groups composed of creators that are
independent contractors but whom wish to negotiate collectively with producers.
See id.
164
Id. at 980. (“[A]ntitrust jurisdiction cannot be declined simply because
independent contractors masquerade as a union.”). The Bernstein decision, by
ruling against another group of creators who are not protected by a labor union,
strengthened producers’ ability to assert antitrust claims against the Dramatists
Guild. See, e.g., Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
165
No. 68 Civ. 5120, 1975 WL 957 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975) (plaintiff, a
stage producer, brought an antitrust action against defendant, an organization of
directors and choreographers in violation of the § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1974)).
166
Id., at *3. The court argued that a producer has a significant amount of
control over the stage director, unlike the limited amount of control the producer
has over the playwright. Because the producer has final control over every aspect
of the director’s job, the court held that stage directors are employees. Id.
167
See Bernstein, 517 F.2d at 976; Julien, 1975 WL 957, at *3.
168
Julien, 1975 WL 957, at *3.
169
Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 555.
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legitimate theatrical attractions”170 by agreeing not to license plays
to producers except upon the minimum terms in the MBPC.171 The
Dramatists Guild counterclaimed against the producers, alleging
that it was the League172 that violated the Sherman Act by setting
non-competitive maximum levels of compensation for
playwrights. 173 The court only decided the producers’ motion to
dismiss or stay the contingent counterclaim, holding that the
Dramatists Guild could bring a counterclaim.174 The competing
antitrust claims produced a deadlock that eventually resulted in an
amicable settlement and a renegotiated APC satisfactory to both
sides.175 However, the threat of antitrust litigation remained and the
APC has not been revised since that settlement in 1983.176
Even though the above cases date back several decades, the
same problems remain as the Dramatists Guild continues to be
prevented from renegotiating the APC by collective bargaining.177
The APC no longer reflects the best terms for either playwrights or
producers,178 yet the Dramatists Guild is powerless to improve the
situation.179 Legislation must be passed to allow the Dramatists
170

Id. at 557.
Id.
172
Specifically, the Dramatists Guild alleged that the Shubert Organization
and the Nederland Organization, which at the time controlled about 70% of the
first-class theaters in New York, were in violation of the Sherman Act. Barr,
573 F. Supp. at 558. See also infra note 231.
173
Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 558. The claim concluded that if and to the
extent that the MBPC was an antitrust violation, it was one in which the theater
owners and producers had used their monopoly power to force the Dramatists
Guild to agree to what became maximum, not minimum, terms set at artificially
low prices by the dominant party. JOHN G. KOELTL & JOHN K IERNAN , T HE
LITIGATION MANUAL: PRETRIAL 55 (1999).
174
Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 563.
175
KOELTL & K IERNAN, supra note 173, at 55.
176
Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of
America).
177
Id.
178
Like any industry, economic realities of the theatre industry have
evolved since the APC was last revised.
179
Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of
America).
171
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Guild and other peer groups of playwrights to collectively bargain
with groups of producers. The ability for playwrights to negotiate
with the support of the Dramatists Guild in the same way that
screenwriters negotiate with the support of the WGA is especially
important now as more Hollywood studios migrate to Broadway
to do business with playwrights.180
III. T HE P LAYWRIGHTS LICENSING A NTITRUST INITIATIVE ACT
The power to negotiate as a group is not limited to
screenwriters and other employees of Hollywood studios.181 Along
with the recent screenwriters strike, in November 2007, stagehands
represented by the Local One of IATSE182 went on strike after
negotiations broke down with the League of American Theaters and
Producers.183 The strike caused the shutdown of 27 shows on
Broadway and a loss in revenue of approximately $17 million per
day.184 The strike lasted for 19 days and was the longest unionsupported strike in the theater industry since a musicians’ strike in
1975.185
In both the WGA and IATSE strikes this past year, issues
arose regarding the negotiation of current and future contracts. 186 It
should logically follow that playwrights should have the same right
to strike in negotiations, yet, this is not the case.187 Current

180

See, e.g., Borys Kit, Marvel Spins Spider-Man into Broadway Musical,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER.COM, Apr. 20, 2007, at 2.
181
See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, Broadway’s Showdown: The Lowdown,
N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at B1.
182
Id. at B1 (describing the Local One of IATSE as “the most powerful of
Broadway unions”).
183
Id.
184
Campbell Robertson, On Broadway, Gloom Hangs Over Holidays,
N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A1.
185
Campbell Robertson, On Broadway: Deal Reached by Stagehands,
N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 29, 2007, at A1.
186
See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126; see also Robertson, supra note
185.
187
See Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of
America).
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antitrust laws188 prevent playwrights from collectively negotiating
a standard form contract for the production of their works.189 This
puts playwrights at a distinct disadvantage in bargaining with
producers.190 With this disadvantage in mind, Congress has
attempted to amend antitrust laws and enable playwrights to
bargain collectively under the Playwright Licensing Antitrust
Initiative Act, which, although sponsored numerous times in the
House and Senate, has yet to be put to a vote.191
A. Precursors to the Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative
Act
On December 19, 2001, Congressmen Henry Hyde and Barney
Frank introduced the Fair Play for Playwrights Act of 2001 to the
House of Representatives.192 The bill’s purpose was to “modify
the application of the antitrust laws to authorize collective
negotiations among playwrights and producers regarding the
development, licensing, and production of plays.”193 The bill would
modify antitrust laws to allow associations of playwrights 194 to
establish and enforce “minimum terms and conditions on which the
works of such playwrights could be developed, licensed, or
produced,” and allowed playwrights and producers to have
188

See supra text accompanying note 154; see also Hearing, supra note
155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of America).
189
Hearing, supra note 28 (statement of Senator Orin Hatch) (“As a result,
playwrightswho are frequently at a substantial bargaining disadvantageare
forced to accept contracts on a take it or leave it basis.”).
190
Id. Though playwrights in theory maintain control over their intellectual
property, they must defend against producers taking control of their works
contractually. With the swell of powerful movie studios flooding Broadway as
producers, it is getting harder for playwrights to fight to keep their intellectual
property in solo negotiations. See Weidman, supra note 6, at 644 (“[T]he
pressures are intense, and with the appearance of more and more studio-produced
musicals . . . those pressures are only going to grow more intense.”).
191
Zamora, supra note 18, at 395. See, e.g., Playwrights Licensing
Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, S. 2349, 108th Cong. (2004).
192
Fair Play for Playwrights Act of 2001, H.R. 3543, 107th Cong. (2001).
193
H.R. 3543.
194
E.g., the Dramatists Guild.
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discussions “for the purpose of negotiating, implementing, or
enforcing a standard form contract or other collective agreement
governing the terms and conditions on which playwrights’ works
will be developed, licensed, or produced.”195 Although the bill was
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, it never reached
the voting stage.196
In another attempt to push similar legislation, Senators Orrin
Hatch and Chuck Schumer introduced the Playwrights Licensing
Relief Act of 2002 to the Senate.197 This bill proposed that
antitrust laws should not apply to “any joint discussion,
consideration, review, action, or agreement for the express purpose
of, and limited to, the development of a standard form contract
containing minimum terms of artistic protection and levels of
compensation for playwrights.”198 This second attempt made clear
that the collective negotiation powers would be limited to the
creation of a modern APC.199 Unfortunately, the bill met a similar
195

H.R. 3543.
The House bill was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on
December 19, 2001. See GovTracks for H.R. 3543, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h107-3543 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). Failure to act on
the bill essentially kills it until it can be reintroduced in the next Congress. See
Government 101: How a Bill Becomes Law, http://www.votesmart.org/
resource_govt101_02.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
197
Playwrights Licensing Relief Act of 2002, S. 2082, 107th Cong.
(2002), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s107-2082
(last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
198
S. 2082; see Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions,
Senate, Apr. 10, 2002 (Senator Hatch’s introduction of S. 2082 before the
Senate), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r107:2:./temp/
~r107NIwQ2g:e0 (“Playwrights and their voluntary peer membership
organization, the Dramatists Guild, operate under the shadow of the antitrust
laws, and substantially without the ability to coordinate their actions in
protecting their interests. This has impeded playwrights’ ability to act
collectively in dealing with highly-organized and unionized groups, such as
actors, directors, and choreographers, on the one hand, and the increasingly
consolidated producers and investors on the other.”).
199
S. 2082. The bill revised the language of Section 2 of the bill to specify
that antitrust laws shall not apply to “joint or collective voluntary actions for
the limited purposes of developing a standard form contract by playwrights or
their representatives.” Id. (emphasis added).
196
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fate as the one sponsored in the House—it was read twice and once
again was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary where it
died.200
Continuing to fight for playwrights, Senator Hatch, along with
Senator Edward Kennedy, again introduced the bill to the Senate,
using the same language but with a new titlethe Playwrights
Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004 (“PLAI”).201 The new
bill gathered more momentum than its predecessor and hearings
were held before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 28,
2004.202 The committee heard testimony from famous playwrights
Wendy Wasserstein,203 Stephen Sondheim,204 and Arthur Miller,205
representatives of the Dramatists Guild,206 and representatives
from the League of American Theaters and Producers,207 as well as
opening remarks from Senator Hatch.208

200

See S. 2082.
Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, S. 2349, 108th
Cong. (2004).
202
The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004).
203
Author of Tony Award and Pulitzer Prize winning play “ The Heidi
Chronicles.” See Charles Isherwood, Wendy Wasserstein Dies at 55; Her Plays
Spoke to a Generation, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at A1.
204
Author of works such as “Follies” (1971), “A Little Night Music”
(1973), “Pacific Overtures” (1976), “Sweeney Todd” (1979) and “Merrily We
Roll Along” (1981). See Internet Broadway Database, http://www.ibdb.com/
person.asp?ID=12430 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
205
Author of “Death of a Salesman” (1949) and “The Crucible” (1953). See
Internet Broadway Database http://www.ibdb.com/person.asp?ID=4316 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2008).
206
See Hearing, supra note 75 (statement of Marsha Norman, Vice
President, Dramatists Guild).
207
See The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding
the Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Roger
Berlind, Producer).
208
See Hearing, supra note 28 (statement of Senator Orin Hatch).
201
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1. Testimony in Support of PLAI
First, Senator Hatch noted that the PLAI would enable
playwrights, through the Dramatists Guild and any other peer
organizations, to collectively deal with “other industry groups that
operate both under and behind the bright lights of the American
stage.”209 He emphasized that the bill only covered collective
adoption and implementation, as opposed to collective
enforcement, of an updated APC. 210 Such a distinction is important
because the functional purpose of the PLAI is to allow for the
emendation and modernization of the APC, which individual
playwrights can then use as a template in individual negotiations.211
Such collective deal making was important because, as playwright
Wendy Wasserstein testified, the voice of the playwright “has
become much more challenged as the ownership of the theaters and
the production of plays has become increasingly dominated by
corporate interests.”212
Ms. Wasserstein emphasized that every other creative
contributor to the theater had union representation and is able to
bargain collectively, leaving playwrights at a distinct
disadvantage.213 Importantly, she stated that the purpose of the
PLAI was not to “force a producer to produce a play,” but rather,
to develop a standard form contract so that the playwright’s
copyright would be “respected throughout the production of [a
play].”214
209

Id.
Id. (“My hope is that the basic ability to update the standard form
contract as well as provisions ensuring that certain artists’ rights are respected in
the production of their plays will encourage young, struggling playwrights to
continue working in the field.”).
211
See The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding
the Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Wendy Wasserstein,
playwright).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id. Wasserman echoes the concerns of Dramatists Guild president John
Weidman, who foresees the fight for control between the playwright and major
210
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Similarly stressing the need for improved future relations,
Stephen Sondheim, former president of the Dramatists Guild215 and
current member of its Council,216 emphasized that the bill was not
necessarily for the benefit of established playwrights like himself,
but rather it was for the younger generation of playwrights
struggling to negotiate with ever-powerful producers.217 To
illustrate the extent of a playwright’s struggle, he told the
Committee an anecdote about his play “Merrily We Role Along,”
written to go backwards in time, starting at the end and proceeding
to the beginning.218 At one time, a producer demanded that Mr.
Sondheim reverse the order of eventscompletely contrary to his
artistic invention.219 Mr. Sondheim pointed out that while he was
able to maintain the integrity of his intellectual property because of
his status in the theater industry, many young unknown
playwrights do not have the same leverage when negotiating with
producers.220
Some of the testimony before the Committee focused more on
the detrimental after-effects that would likely come from continued
strained relations between playwrights and producers. In his
motion picture studios acting as producers (Wasserman’s “coprporate interests”)
as a “slippery slope down which the playwright’s copyright [control] runs the
risk of sliding into oblivion.” Weidman, supra note 6, at 645.
215
Sondheim served as president from 1973 to 1981. The Playwrights
Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the Future of American Live
Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Stephen Sondheim,
playwright). During his tenure as president, he founded the Young Playwrights,
Inc. which supports the work of playwrights under the age of eighteen. See
Sondheim on YPI, http://www.youngplaywrights.org/ from%20Steve.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2008).
216
The Board of Directors of the Dramatists Guild is called the Council.
The general management, direction, and control of the Dramatists Guild vests
with the Council and the Council would have the authority to negotiate a new
APC if the PLAI were passed. See Constitution of the Dramatists Guild of
America, Inc., Art. V, Sec. 1, available at http://www.dramatistsguild.
com/about_ constitution.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
217
Hearing, supra note 215 (statement of Stephen Sondheim, playwright).
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
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testimony, playwright Arthur Miller argued that “American theater
risks losing the next generation of playwrights to other media and
opportunities as the pressures on playwrights increase and their
power to protect their economic and artistic interests diminish.”221
Mr. Miller emphasized that with the growing pressures of
corporate interests in the theater, “only one entity does not have a
seat at the bargaining table: the playwrights.”222 He explained that
the PLAI would allow the APC to be updated to “take account of
today’s market realities and intellectual property protection
climate.”223
Vice president of the Dramatists Guild, Marsha Norman,
agreed with Mr. Miller that young playwrights were being lost “to
television and other unionized venues which pay them in advance
and don’t quibble over the price.”224 She noted that half of her
students in the Julliard playwriting program in 2004 left for
California to talk to television-show runners and producers and
argued that once writers leave the theater, they rarely return. 225
Ms. Norman contended that without a standard contract for young
and mid-career playwrights to rely upon, they would continue to
leave the theater and lose the creative rights afforded to them as
playwrights in exchange for being guaranteed a paycheck in
Hollywood.226
221

The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the
Future of American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the Subcomm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Arthur Miller).
222
Id.
223
Id. Miller notes that the APC has not been updated since 1982. Since
that time, intellectual property has increasingly come under the control of
corporate interests like major motion picture studios, and Miller advocates that
the PLAI should be passed so that the APC can meet and counter the demands
of these powerful corporate interests. Id.
224
Hearing, supra note 75 (statement of Marsha Norman, Vice President,
Dramatists Guild).
225
Id. (“[W]e try to warn the writers about the dangers of work for hire, but
at the moment, the Broadway arena is offering them little reason to stay.”).
226
Id. Unlike the guaranteed paycheck in Hollywood, few playwrights’
works are ever produced, so while they maintain their intellectual property, it
has no real value for the struggling playwrights. See Weidman, supra note 6, at
642; see also Jonakait, supra note 69, at 403–04.
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In addition to the testimony given before Congress by these
prominent playwrights, the Dramatists Guild of America
submitted its own statement for the hearing record.227 The official
statement addressed the string of decisions involving the
Dramatists Guild and its resulting inability to collectively
bargain.228 The Dramatists Guild argued that the cases attempted to
reconcile labor and anti-trust issues, but face “a daunting challenge
in the unique environment of the Broadway Theater.”229 Moreover,
it pointed out that the PLAI was not an attempt to reconcile larger
issues of anti-trust and labor law, but rather a simple solution to
the small but important arena of American theaterthe ability to
renegotiate and modernize the APC without breaking the law.230
2. Testimony in Opposition to PLAI
Not all parties at the Committee hearing, however, were
supportive of the proposed legislation. Representing the
opposition to the PLAI were the producers, backed by the
Broadway League.231 Gerald Schoenfeld, Chairman of both the
Shubert Organization232 and of the Broadway League,233 testified in
227

Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of
America).
228
Id; see Ring I, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945); Julien v. Soc’y of Stage
Directors & Choreographers, No. 68 Civ. 5120, 1975 WL 957, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 14, 1975); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.
1975).
229
Hearing, supra note 155 (statement of the Dramatists Guild of
America). The Guild argues that because the Broadway theater industry is
unique in the way that it conducts business, it is difficult to categorize
dramatists as common law employees or independent contractors in the same
way those labels are used in more traditional labor scenarios. Id. Because of this
difficulty in categorization, the Dramatists Guild argues the PLAI is necessary as
an appropriate remedy. Id.
230
Id.
231
See Hearing, supra note 146 (statement of Gerald Schoenfeld, Chairman
of The League of American Theaters and Producers); Hearing, supra note 207
(statement of Roger Berlind, Producer).
232
The Shubert Organization is the oldest and largest theater owner on
Broadway, owning and operating seventeen Broadway theaters and one OffBroadway theater. The Shubert Organization not only owns the theaters, it also
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opposition to the bill.234 Above all, Mr. Schoenfeld expressed his
concern that because producers had to worry about the evolving
demands of theatre, they needed the flexibility to respond to
situations, as they arose, through individual negotiations.235
Specifically, he explained that under the APC, it had been
necessary for producers to draft addendums to each individual
agreement since 1985 in order to meet the demands of modern
theater, e.g., the creation of royalty pools.236 However, Schoenfeld
argued that the negotiating power of producers would be hindered
if producers were required to negotiate using the terms of the APC
and comply with Dramatists Guild certification.237
produces plays and controls almost all Broadway ticket sales through its
subsidiary Telecharge. See Shubert Organization homepage, http://www.
shubertorganization.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). The Dramatists Guild
contends that the Shubert Organization has kept a harsh grip over the theater
industry for years, not only controlling 70% of the first-class theaters but also
dominating the Broadway League by dictating the terms on which they will
produce playwrights’ plays. See Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555,
558 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
233
The Broadway League, formerly the League of American Theaters and
Producers, is the national trade association for theater owners, producers, and
general theater managers. See Broadway League homepage, http://www.
broadwayleague.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
234
Hearing, supra note 146 (statement of Gerald Schoenfeld, Chairman of
The League of American Theaters and Producers) (“If there are any restraints
upon the production of plays and musicals they are imposed by the [Dramatists]
Guild and its members and not the producers or the venue operators.”).
235
Id.
236
Because the form APC was last negotiated in 1985, it is necessary to
add terms that were not common practice 25 years ago, such as forms of press,
approval of venues, and royalty pools. Id. A royalty pool provides for a certain
percentage of the weekly net profits to be allocated to the royalty participants
(producers, playwright, director, among others) by creating an equation where
the total of all of the royalty percentages is the denominator and the numerator is
the percentage paid to each royalty participant. Id. As Schoenfeld explains, if the
royalty pool participants receive 35% of the weekly operating profits, the total
royalties are 15%, and the playwright’s negotiated royalty is 6%, then the
playwright in the pool receives 6/15 of 35% of the weekly net profits. Id.
237
Id. Schoenfeld reargues the stance of the Broadway League in Barr v.
Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), that the APC restrains
trade by imposing minimum terms. Id. However, Schoenfeld fails to consider
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Similarly, Broadway producer Roger Berlind testified that
freeing playwrights from the restraints of antitrust laws would be
detrimental for both competition and playwrights.238 Because there
are so many variables in producing a play, producers needed
flexibility in the terms they set.239 He stressed that if the PLAI
were passed, it would destroy the free market of theater producing
and instead place the Dramatists Guild as the “gatekeeper” to preagreed terms.240
Ultimately, while the PLAI of 2004 made it to the hearing
stage, the Senate never put it to a vote and the bill died yet again.241
A strong handful of supporters for the proposed legislation
remained, however. A few months after the bill died in the Senate,
the identical bill, again entitled the PLAI of 2004, was introduced in
the House on June 18, 2004, sponsored by Representatives
Howard Coble, John Conyers, Jr., Barney Frank, and Henry
Hyde.242 The bill once again failed to be taken to a vote.243 Not to
be dissuaded, less than a year later, Representatives Coble,
Conyers, Frank, and Hyde again attempted to introduce the PLAI
of 2005 in the House.244 Predictably, with the language of the bill
that the PLAI allows for the renegotiation and revision of the APC and therefore
does not force acceptance of the contested terms.
238
Hearing, supra note 207 (statement of Roger Berlind, Producer).
239
Berlind argues that all producers do not agree on having the same
structure, price, or terms so it is a misstep to assume that all playwrights agree
on the same standards either. Id.
240
Berlind comes from a Wall Street investment banking background and
draws parallels between producing theater and taking investment risks. Id. He
argues that he has a fiduciary obligation to investors and that allowing the
playwrights to set minimum terms would infringe upon his ability to make a
profit. Id.
241
See Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, S. 2349,
108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.
xpd?bill=s108-2349 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
242
Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, H.R. 4615,
108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.
xpd?bill=h108-4615 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
243
See H.R. 4615.
244
Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2005, H.R. 532, 109th
Cong.
(2005),
available
at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.
xpd?bill=h109-532 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
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unchanged, it again died on the floor without a vote.245 Though the
proposed bills up until this point have been unsuccessful in making
it to the voting stage, advocates have not yet given up and continue
to lobby for the PLAI. Over the past year, the Dramatists Guild
has been lobbying in both the House and the Senate for an
exception from labor laws, as embodied in the PLAI bill, so that
they may collectively bargain without violating antitrust laws.246
Meanwhile, the Broadway League has been successfully spending
their time and money lobbying Congress to stall on the Dramatists
Guild’s legislative proposals.247
IV. WHY CONGRESS SHOULD ACT NOW
Given the competing agendas and continued struggle between
playwrights and producers, the PLAI represents a worthwhile
attempt to address and correct the disparate bargaining power
between the parties.248 It is undeniable that producers on
Broadway are very financially strong,249 and the Broadway League,
controlled by the Shubert Foundation, has at times resembled a
monopoly.250 Nevertheless, with the ever-growing influx of
Hollywood studios producing on Broadway 251 and the subsequent
mounting pressure to do business according to a Hollywood model,
as with screenwriters,252 the gulf in bargaining strength between
playwrights and powerful studios as producers has grown even
wider.253
245

See H.R. 532.
E-mail from David Faux, Director of Business Affairs, Dramatists Guild,
to Ashley Kelly (Oct. 17, 2007, 14:25:17 EST) (on file with author).
247
Id.
248
See Zamora, supra note 18, at 428.
249
For example, the Shubert Organization gives out millions of dollars
worth of grants to attract shows to its theaters. See N.R. Kleinfield, I.R.S.
Ruling Wrote Script for the Shubert Tax Break, N.Y. T IMES, July 11, 1994, at
A1.
250
See Barr v. Dramatists Guild, 573 F. Supp. 555, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
See also supra text accompanying note 232.
251
See, e.g., Kuchwara, supra note 4.
252
Weidman, supra note 6, at 644.
253
Id.
246
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A. Battling the Giants: Hollywood Studios on Broadway

The influx of Hollywood producers to Broadway was, in a
way, entirely foreseeable. For large motion picture studios with a
hit film, a move to adapt a pic-to-legit musical for Broadway has an
added advantage over other straight Broadway productions.254 As
opposed to an original musical like “Avenue Q”255 that must build
a reputation by word of mouth, 256 people already have an interest
in “Spider-Man the Musical”257 or “The Little Mermaid”258
because they saw, and likely enjoyed, the films.259 Because the
branding for a pic-to-legit musical is already in place,260 Broadway
has become yet another arena for movie studios to expand their
successful franchises.261 Inevitably, this is why almost every major
studio is making its mark on Broadway, including Fox Theatricals
producing “Legally Blonde The Musical,”262 Dreamworks

254

See Rogers, supra note 5.
“Avenue Q,” the surprise winner of the 2004 Tony award for Best
Musical, started out in a small Off-Broadway theater before transferring to
Broadway after a year. See Jesse McKinley, “Avenue Q” Tony Coup is Buzz of
Broadway, N.Y. T IMES, June 8, 2004, at E1.
256
See Rogers, supra note 5.
257
The musical adaptation of the 2002 Spider-Man film produced by Sony
Pictures is currently in development stages. See Ernio Hernandez, Spider-Man
Musical to Take Gotham in Upcoming Reading, PLAYBILL, Apr. 16, 2007,
available at http://www.playbill.com/news/article/107378.html.
258
The musical adaptation of the 1989 animated Disney film opened on
Broadway on January 10, 2008. See Ben Brantley, Fish Out of Water in the
Deep Blue Sea, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at E1.
259
See Rogers, supra note 5.
260
Id.
261
See, e.g., Kuchwara, supra note 4. The Shrek franchise is an apt
example, with the forthcoming musical joining the revenue streams from toys, tshirts, and more film sequels. See Weidman, supra note 6, at 644. In the recent
review of “The Little Mermaid” musical, Ben Brantley remarked that the show
felt like a cynical reversal of art and commerce: “It used to be that the show
came first, followed by merchandising tie-ins. Thoroughly plastic and
trinketlike, this show seems less like an interpretation of a movie musical than
of the figurines and toys it inspired.” Brantley, supra note 257, at E1.
262
See Cox, supra note 1, at 39.
255
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Animation producing “Shrek The Musical,”263 Sony Pictures
Entertainment producing “Spider-Man The Musical,”264 and of
course Disney, which hopes to mimic past Broadway successes
“Beauty and the Beast” and “The Lion King” with new
productions of “Mary Poppins” and “The Little Mermaid.”265
Successful branding and automatic audiences, however, are not
the only things that Hollywood producers attempt to bring with
them to Broadway. Studios also come prepared to do business
with playwrights in the same manner they do business with
screenwriters266—intending to contract with playwrights in such a
way as to maintain control of their valuable franchises, including
copyright control.267 In the same way that the studios argue that
their financial interests behind a film entitle them to control over
authorship, they are attempting to secure intellectual property
rights from playwrights as well.268
The clearest example of this growing disparity in bargaining
power is illustrated by the studios’ attempts to apply the work for
hire doctrine to playwrights, and the playwrights’ inability to
effectively fight back against the studios.269 While a playwright
may challenge a work for hire clause as playwrights are neither
employees of the theatre or the Hollywood studio,270 nor among
the nine categories of works that can be specially ordered or
commissioned,271 most playwrights do not have the financial

263

See BWW News Desk, Shrek Musical Announces Creative Team, ‘08
Debut Potential, BROADWAY W ORLD , Oct. 12, 2006, available at http://www.
broadwayworld.com/viewcolumn.cfm?colid=12880.
264
See Kit, supra note 180, at 2.
265
See Weidman, supra note 6, at 645. See also Kuchwara, supra note 4.
266
See Weidman, supra note 6, at 645.
267
See id.
268
See Gulick, supra note 99, at 66.
269
See Weidman, supra note 6, at 644 (“[T]he most aggressive of the
movie studios [bring] with them . . . a desire to do business, not according to
the theater model which puts the playwright in first position, but according to
the Hollywood model, in which the producing studio own[s] the author’s
copyright and writers [can] be hired and fired at will.”).
270
See Weidman, supra note 6, at 641–42.
271
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
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resources to raise such a challenge in court.272 Even assuming the
work for hire clause could be contracted around, studios are still
frequently able to exercise their superior bargaining power in
obtaining assignments from playwrights, 273 effectually taking away
the playwrights’ creative property rights anyway.
A hypothetical will further illustrate the impact of a work-forhire clause, as well as the unequal bargaining between the parties.
Consider the following: A writer with both a playwrighting and
screenwriting background receives a Writers Agreement from a large
motion picture studio to adapt a non-fiction book. The contract
combines screenwriting services with an additional clause called
“Playwright Services,” granting the writer the first opportunity to
write the musical based on the screenplay he was hired to write.
The clause could include the language “these services shall be
rendered on a ‘work-for-hire basis’ for copyright purposes,”
meaning that the writer signs over both his copyright of the
screenplay, as well as the copyright in stage rights. More
specifically, the contract may grant the studio rights that are very
broad: “for all time, exclusively and throughout the world, all rights
to use the Property as the basis of or in connection with stage
plays (straight plays or musicals) and other live theatrical
productions, and all ancillary and subsidiary rights related thereto.”
Under this language, the studio, before the screenplay has even
been written, takes control of the stage rights, using the language
“work for hire” to do so. Further, the contractual language may also
include a tagline such as, “and if this is not a work-for-hire, then it
is an assignment.” While the writer may attempt to negotiate with
the studio to license his stage rights, he unfortunately must handle
the negotiation because, unlike the WGA, the Dramatists Guild is
not able to negotiate minimum terms without violating antitrust
laws. Likely, the writer will be told by the studio that altering the
stage rights is a deal-breaker. Desperate to not lose the deal, the
writer will often sign away all of his rights.
272

Additionally, the Dramatists Guild as a trade organization is not in a
position to give legal aid to individual members.
273
Smith, supra note 96, at 30. Contracts will often state that if the work
is not a work made for hire then it is an assignment, acting as a catch-all for the
studio in securing all necessary rights. Id.
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As the presence of motion picture studios on Broadway grows
stronger, agreements like the hypothetical are becoming more
common. Playwrights need the power and protection of the
Dramatists Guild now more than ever to balance the current
inequities in bargaining power and the growing threat of
exploitation. Indeed, “playwrights may often be so desperate to get
their play produced and seen by audiences, that they will accept
terms that are detrimental to their own interests.”274 If Congress
passed the PLAI, the Dramatists Guild could start to regain ground
in bargaining power and playwrights could begin to feel secure in
their choice to stay in the world of theater rather than migrating to
the world of screenwriting.
Certainly the above demonstrates the extent to which major
studios may strip playwrights, and screenwriters, of their ultimate
rights. As noted, unlike screenwriters, playwrights do not have the
backing of an organized guild that may bargain collectively on their
behalf. The recent strikes of both the WGA275 and IATSE on
behalf of Broadway stagehands276 illustrates that guilds can
effectively assert bargaining power over powerful producers.277
Fairness requires that Congress level the playing field for
playwrights as they are the last remaining group of creative
professionals that must bargain alone278 without the support of a
guild with collective bargaining authority. 279 It is because of the
strength that the screenwriters have through the power of the
WGA and the stagehands through the power of IATSE that they
were able to successfully stand up against studios and producers in
2007 and 2008 and continue to negotiate effectively today.280
Congress should no longer favor the power of studios, producers
274

Zamora, supra note 18, at 428.
See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1. The WGA secured coveted
residuals for new media.
276
See Robertson, supra note 185, at B1.
277
See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1; Robertson, supra note 185,
at B1.
278
See supra Part II.B.
279
Id.
280
See Verrier & Eller, supra note 126, at C1; Robertson, supra note 185,
at B1.
275
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and their money, but rather, embrace a policy that stimulates
creativity by ensuring protection of young playwrights.
B. Following Legislative Precedence
Congress can protect young playwrights by passing the PLAI.
Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its concern for motion
picture studios, which argue that the work for hire doctrine
protects their financial well-being.281 Throughout the revision
process of the Copyright Act of 1978, Congress argued that work
for hire was appropriate in light of the power of the WGA 282 and
operated under the assumption that the Dramatists Guild’s
playwrights “take care of themselves.”283 Today, however, these
two assumptions are in tension with one another given the influx of
motion picture studios into the realm of Broadway. The power of
the studios, which can be managed with the power of a collectively
bargaining guild, is not a legally viable option for playwrights
without the PLAI.

281

See MPAA Statement, supra note 85, at 302 (“[W]e have indicated all
along that provisions such as [the work for hire provisions] are the heart and
soul of the operation of commercial and personnel relationships in our industry,
without which there would be a very severe upset. Such remains true today and
will be the cornerstone of our position with Congress.”). See also Copyright
Law Revision, Part 2: Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law Before H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 358–59 (1964) (statement of Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc.).
282
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 2237, at 115 (1966) (rejecting proposed “shop
right” doctrine changes to the work for hire doctrine because “[w]hile the change
might theoretically improve the bargaining position of screenwriters and others
as a group, the practical benefits that individual authors would receive are highly
conjectural.”).
283
Copyright Law Revision, Part 5: 1964 Revision Bill with Discussion
and Comments Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 239 (1965)
(statement made by Irwin Karp, on behalf of the Authors League of America)
(“The Dramatists Guild represents the very few professional playwrights in the
United States whose work is presented on Broadway and who are able to take
care of themselves.”).
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1. How the Revision Process of the Work for Hire Doctrine from
1956 to 1976 Informs on Congressional Attitudes Towards
Bargaining Power of Writers
The revision of the Copyright Act in 1976 was the culmination
of two decades of research acquired from the testimony of
approximately 200 witnesses before the Subcommittee on
Copyrights.284 One of the major issues considered was the work
for hire definition, specifically, the category of works prepared on
special order or commission.285 The preliminary draft of the
revision defined works made for hire as excluding all works made
on special order or commission, but the first draft was met with
“strenuous opposition from . . . motion picture companies.”286
The motion picture studios asserted that exclusion of specially
ordered works or commissioned works would create
insurmountable obstacles and major economic dislocation.287
Moreover, the motion picture studios argued that because they
exercised creative control over a composite of screenwriters’
works, they should be considered the author for copyright
purposes.288 While writers argued that the burden of bargaining
284

Smith, supra note 96, at 26–27.
Id.
286
Anne Marie Hill, The “Work For Hire” Definition in the Copyright
Act of 1976: Conflict Over Specially Ordered or Commissioned Work, 74
CORNELL L. R EV . 559, 581 (1989).
287
See Copyright Law Revision, Part 4: Further Discussions and
Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law Before H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 274 (1964); see also Copyright Law
Revision, Part 2: Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law Before H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 153 (1964) (“It must be borne in mind
that motion picture producers may and do risk millions of dollars in the
production and exploitation of a film, and by their efforts and expenditure
substantially enhance the value of the story, novel, or play which is the basis of
the picture.”).
288
Hill, supra note 286, at 568. Saul Rittenberg of MGM commented: “If
I commission a work from a man, ordering a work specially for my purposes,
and I pay for it, what difference does it make whether I put him under my
employment contract or establish an independent contractor relationship?”
285
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should be placed on the party with more ready access to legal
advice,289 the motion picture studios countered that the writers
were represented by guilds, lawyers, and accountants, and
therefore bargaining power was equal.290
Another main issue in contention was the writers request for
something similar to the “shop right” doctrine in patent law, which
would give the commissioning party the right to use the writer’s
work to the extent needed but allow the writer to retain all other
rights as long as she did not authorize a competing use.291 The
motion picture producers also challenged this right, arguing that the
costs would be too much to bear for producers.292 Specifically, the
producers argued that while they took on a number of substantial
financial risks, motion picture writers were insulated from loss, and
writers already receive shares of producers’ revenue under
collective-bargaining agreements set forth by the WGA.293
Ultimately, Congress had to decide between excluding
commissioned works and “possibly crippling the production of . . .
composite works” like films294 or jeopardizing the rights of writers
by including commissioned works in the work for hire definition.295
In the end, Congress accepted a compromise: in exchange for
concessions from the commissioning parties for termination of
transfer rights in limited circumstances,296 the writers consented to
the second clause of the work for hire doctrine, which classified
nine specific categories of works, including motion pictures, as
works for hire if the parties expressly agreed in writing.297 The
“shop right” proposal was altogether rejected as “mere conjecture”
Gorman, supra note 86, at 23.
289
Smith, supra note 96, at 26–27.
290
Id.
291
H.R. R EP. N O. 2237, at 115 (1966).
292
H.R. R EP. N O. 2237, at 115.
293
H.R. REP. NO . 2237, at 115. The writers receive their advance and
option payments no matter what, but the producers take on the risk of loss if the
film was not successful.
294
See supra text accompanying note 98.
295
Hill, supra note 286, at 569–70.
296
See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1976).
297
Gorman, supra note 86, at 23.
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as to its ability to bring a benefit to writers.298
2. Later Attempts at Revision
While the writers may not have been as successful as they had
wished with the Copyright Act of 1976, they continued to argue
that the writing requirementthat a work for hire clause
specifically be in contractual languageoffered virtually no
protection because of their inherent lack of bargaining power to
exclude such a clause.299 Joining their cause, Senator Cochran
subsequently attempted to revise the work for hire doctrine by
regularly introducing a series of bills addressing writers’ concerns
of a disadvantaged bargaining position.300 Of note, however, is that
in the language of these bills Senator Cochran proposed to eliminate
every category of works that may be specially ordered or
commissioned except motion pictures.301 He argued to Congress
that motion pictures were uniquely collaborative works requiring a
work for hire relationship and employees in the motion picture
industry were sufficiently protected by union and guild contracts
and therefore less likely to be the victims of overreaching.302 None
of Senator Cochran’s bills made it out of committee,303 and the

298

H.R. REP. NO . 2237, at 115 (“The presumption that initial ownership
rights vest in the employer for hire is well established in American copyright
law . . . To exchange it for the uncertainties of the shop right doctrine would not
only be of dubious value to employers and employees alike, but might also
reopen a number of other issues and produce dissension.”).
299
Hill, supra note 286, at 569.
300
See Smith, supra note 96, at 21 n.8 (citing S. 2044, 97th Cong.
(1982); S. 2138, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 2330, 99th Cong. (1986), S. 1223,
100th Cong. (1987); S. 1253 101st Cong. (1989)).
301
See S. 2044; S. 2138; S. 2330; S. 1223; S. 1253.
302
See Smith, supra note 96, at 41. Cochran fails to recognize, however,
that the guilds were formed out of necessity to fight overreaching. Victimization
of employees in motion pictures is still quite pervasive even with the guilds.
The guilds struggle every day to try and prevent pervasive overreaching.
303
See, e.g., Library of Congress tracking report for S. 1253,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d101:s01253: (last visited Apr. 1,
2008).
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Senate never adopted his proposal.304
Congress previously enacted work for hire legislation which led
to studios retaining control over motion pictures by accepting
arguments about equal bargaining strength between screenwriters
(and their union) and studios. Congress should also fortify the
American playwrights against the bargaining power of the motion
picture studios as Broadway producers by passing the PLAI,
thereby empowering groups of playwright to collectively bargain.
Additionally, as a matter of policy, copyright law strives to
protect and motivate individuals whose creativity produce works
that will enhance the culture and development of society. 305 By
passing the PLAI, Congress will strengthen the bargaining power of
the next generation of playwrights by giving them an assurance
through the Dramatists Guild and any other voluntary peer
organization that their rights are respected and their agreements
include fair compensation.
CONCLUSION
Young screenwriters in Hollywood do not have to negotiate
with large motion picture studios alone.306 As members of the
WGA, they enter agreements with the collective voice of all
screenwriters and strive for fair compensation for all.307 With the
ever-expanding migration of Hollywood studios to Broadway,
young playwrights increasingly face negotiations with these same
motion picture studios—studios that are looking to do business in
the same way that it is done in Hollywood. 308 Congress must not
leave these playwrights to negotiate alone and without any
support. By passing the PLAI and allowing for the modernization
of the Dramatists Guild’s APC, Congress will increase the strength
of American playwrights’ bargaining power and ensure that the
vibrancy of American live theater continues for years to come.
304
305
306
307
308

Hill, supra note 286, at 569.
Hill, supra note 286, at 580.
See supra Part II.A.
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.

